The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has, in recent years, undertaken an ambitious and far-reaching transformation that commands the attention of global strategists and policymakers. This evolution is not merely incremental but represents a sweeping reform designed to project power globally and assert Beijing’s strategic interests. As of 2025, the questions surrounding the true extent and effectiveness of this burgeoning military force are becoming increasingly pertinent and complex to answer with absolute certainty.
The trajectory of China’s military development suggests a clear intent to reshape the international security landscape. From unprecedented technological leaps to a significant expansion of its global footprint, the PLA is signaling a departure from its historical role as a largely defensive, regional force. This push for modernization is deeply intertwined with President Xi Jinping’s vision of national rejuvenation, aiming for a “world-class military” by 2049, capable of meeting perceived global security challenges.
Against a backdrop of geopolitical tensions—evidenced by incidents such as a Chinese warship allegedly targeting a German aircraft with a military-grade laser and Taiwan conducting its largest-ever war drills—the strategic implications of China’s military rise are profound. This article delves into the core components of China’s military strength, exploring the tangible advancements and persistent uncertainties that define its current posture and future trajectory, particularly focusing on its air power and the broader mechanisms enabling its growing global reach.
1. **China’s Sweeping Military Modernization: Ambition and Reform** China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is undergoing a profound and rapid modernization that is arguably the most significant since its inception. This transformation is not merely about acquiring new hardware; it encompasses comprehensive structural reforms, a redefinition of operational doctrine, and an unyielding commitment to technological superiority. President Xi Jinping initiated the most sweeping overhaul of the PLA since the 1950s in 2015, introducing a streamlined joint command structure closely modeled on the U.S. military.
These reforms reorganized the previous seven military regions into five theater commands and established a Joint Staff Department to coordinate integrated, multi-domain operations. This shift signals a move away from a traditional, land-centric force towards one capable of sophisticated, combined-arms operations across air, sea, land, and space. The overarching goal, articulated by President Xi, is to build a “world-class military” that is commensurate with China’s global power aspirations by 2049, underpinning the nation’s broader agenda of national rejuvenation.
The Pentagon’s annual China Military Power Report, mandated by Congress, chronicles this dramatic rise in the PLA’s capabilities, noting improvements in both number and quality across its nuclear, space, missile, and aviation forces. Chinese leaders, as a senior defense official observed, “perceive themselves as a global power with global security interests that requires military capabilities commensurate with meeting that challenge.” This ambition is evident in the PLA’s evolving focus on projecting power beyond China’s immediate periphery, including the First Island Chain and into the open seas.
Despite internal challenges, such as corruption purges within the military leadership and a slowing economy, the commitment to military modernization remains steadfast. Experts like Zack Cooper of the American Enterprise Institute note that despite economic headwinds, it is “full steam ahead” for China’s military buildup. This sustained drive underscores the strategic importance Beijing places on its military capabilities as an essential part of creating an international environment conducive to its national rejuvenation.
This continuous, comprehensive modernization effort highlights China’s determination to enhance its ability to operate militarily beyond its traditional spheres of influence. The reforms are not merely about increasing capacity but about fundamentally altering the PLA’s operational philosophy and global footprint. This strategic reorientation positions China to assert itself more forcefully on the international stage, requiring a deep understanding of its evolving capabilities and intentions from the global community.
Military equipment: Xi Jinping
Name: Xi Jinping
NativeName: nobold
NativeNameLang: zh-Hans-CN
Caption: Xi in 2025
Office: General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party
TermStart: 15 November 2012
Predecessor: Hu Jintao
Office1: President of China
Premier1: Li Keqiang,Li Qiang
Vicepresident1: undefined
TermStart1: 14 March 2013
Predecessor1: Hu Jintao
Office2: Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)
Deputy2: Fan Changlong,Xu Qiliang,Zhang Youxia,He Weidong
TermStart2: Party Commission: 15 November 2012,State Commission: 14 March 2013
Predecessor2: Hu Jintao
Office3: Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission
1blankname3: Chairman
1namedata3: Hu Jintao
Alongside3: Guo Boxiong
Term3: Party Commission:
18 October 2010 – 15 November 2012,State Commission:
28 October 2010 – 14 March 2013
Office4: Vice President of China
President4: Hu Jintao
TermStart4: 15 March 2008
TermEnd4: 14 March 2013
Predecessor4: Zeng Qinghong
Successor4: Li Yuanchao
BirthDate: [object Object]
BirthPlace: Beijing, China
Party: Chinese Communist Party
Spouse: [object Object]
Children: Xi Mingze
Residence: Zhongnanhai
Education: B. S.,LL.D.
Parents: Xi Zhongxun,Qi Xin
Relatives: Qi Qiaoqiao
Signature: Xi Jinping signature (2023).svg
Footnotes: Collapsible list
Titlestyle: background-color:#FCF; text-align:center;
Title: Other offices held
Bullets: on
Module: Infobox scientist
Embed: true
ThesisTitle: A Tentative Study on China’s Rural Marketization
ThesisUrl: https://archive.org/details/20220730_20220730_1031
ThesisYear: 2001
DoctoralAdvisor: lang
Module2: Listen
Module3: Infobox Chinese
Child: true
Pic: Xi Jinping (Chinese characters).svg
Piccap: “Xi Jinping” in simplified (top) and traditional (bottom) Chinese characters
Picupright: 0.5
S: 习近平
T: 習近平
P: Xí Jìnpíng
Bpmf: ㄒㄧˊ ㄐㄧㄣˋ ㄆㄧㄥˊ
W: tonesup
Wyr: Syí Jìnpíng
Mps: Shí Jìn-píng
Mi: IPAc-cmn
H: Sip^6 Kiun^4 Pin^2
Phfs: Si̍p Khiun-phìn
Y: Jaahp Gahn-pìhng
Ci: IPAc-yue
J: Zaap6 Gan6-ping4
Poj: Si̍p Kīn-pêng
Tl: Si̍p Kīn-pîng
Bp: Síp Gîn-bíng
Buc: Sĭk Gê̤ṳng-ping
Lmz: Zih8 Jin6-bin6
Order: st
Awards: List of awards and honours received by Xi Jinping
Alt: Xi in 2024, wearing black suit, smiling
Nationality: Chinese
Categories: 1953 births, 20th-century Chinese philosophers, 20th-century Chinese politicians, 20th-century atheists, 21st-century Chinese male writers
Summary: Xi Jinping (born 15 June 1953) is a Chinese politician who has been the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and thus the paramount leader of China, since 2012. Since 2013, Xi has also served as the seventh president of China. As a member of the fifth generation of Chinese leadership, Xi is the first CCP general secretary born after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The son of Chinese communist veteran Xi Zhongxun, Xi was exiled to rural Yanchuan County, Shaanxi Province, as a teenager following his father’s purge during the Cultural Revolution. He lived in a yaodong in the village of Liangjiahe, where he joined the CCP after several failed attempts and worked as the local party secretary. After studying chemical engineering at Tsinghua University as a worker-peasant-soldier student, Xi rose through the ranks politically in China’s coastal provinces. Xi was governor of Fujian from 1999 to 2002, before becoming governor and party secretary of neighboring Zhejiang from 2002 to 2007. Following the dismissal of the party secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, Xi was transferred to replace him for a brief period in 2007. He subsequently joined the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the CCP the same year and was the first-ranking secretary of the Central Secretariat in October 2007. In 2008, he was designated as Hu Jintao’s presumed successor as paramount leader. Towards this end, Xi was appointed the eighth vice president and vice chairman of the CMC. He officially received the title of leadership core from the CCP in 2016.
While overseeing China’s domestic policy, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and strengthen internal unity. His anti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including former PSC member Zhou Yongkang. For the sake of promoting “common prosperity”, Xi has enacted a series of policies designed to increase equality, overseen targeted poverty alleviation programs, and directed a broad crackdown in 2021 against the tech and tutoring sectors. Furthermore, he has expanded support for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), emphasized advanced manufacturing and tech development, advanced military-civil fusion, and attempted to reform China’s property sector. Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in mainland China, he initially presided over a zero-COVID policy from January 2020 to December 2022 before ultimately shifting towards a mitigation strategy after COVID-19 protests occurred in China.
Xi has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy particularly with regards to China’s relations with the United States, the nine-dash line in the South China Sea, and the Sino-Indian border dispute. Additionally, for the sake of advancing Chinese economic interests abroad, Xi has sought to expand China’s influence in Africa and Eurasia by championing the Belt and Road Initiative. Xi presided over a deterioration in relations between Beijing and Taipei under Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen, successor of Ma Ying-jeou whom Xi met in 2015. In 2020, Xi oversaw the passage of a national security law in Hong Kong, which clamped down on political opposition in the city, especially pro-democracy activists.
Since coming to power, Xi’s tenure has witnessed a significant increase in censorship and mass surveillance, a deterioration in human rights (including the persecution of Uyghurs), the rise of a cult of personality, and the removal of term limits for the presidency in 2018. Xi’s political ideas and principles, known as Xi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into the party and national constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, including new CCP committees on national security, economic and social reforms, military restructuring and modernization, and the internet. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was re-elected state president for an unprecedented third term in March 2023.
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2. **The Engine of Growth: China’s Defense Budget and Strategic Investment** The financial muscle behind China’s military modernization is its substantial and continuously growing defense budget, which in 2025 is officially reported at around 1.6 to 1.7 trillion yuan, or roughly $240 billion USD. This figure positions China as the second-largest military spender globally, though still significantly trailing the United States, which allocates over $880 billion to defense. The consistent increase, with official data indicating a 7.2 percent rise this year—the third consecutive year of growth exceeding 7 percent—underscores Beijing’s unwavering commitment to its military ambitions.
While the raw numbers are impressive, analysts caution that comparing defense budgets is not always a straightforward endeavor. China’s defense spending, at approximately 1.6%–1.7% of its GDP, is lower than the U.S. percentage (around 3.5%). However, the sheer scale of China’s economy means that even a smaller percentage can fund massive modernization efforts. The critical question, then, revolves around how efficiently and transparently these funds are utilized and what tangible capabilities they are producing.
There is increasing scrutiny on the allocation of China’s military budget, particularly concerning research and development (R&D). Though official breakdowns are limited, open-source intelligence and reports from reputable institutions like RAND Corporation and CSIS suggest a rising share—possibly 20% or more—is being directed towards advanced technologies. This includes cutting-edge areas such as hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems, and next-generation missiles, indicating a strategic focus on future warfare capabilities.
Beijing’s pursuit of PLA modernization is intimately linked to these significant investments in advanced technology. Domains like cyber, space, and long-range precision strike are receiving particular attention, reflecting a strategic vision that extends beyond traditional warfare. This focus on technological superiority aims to bridge capability gaps with top-tier military powers and potentially establish new areas of advantage.
Despite the rapid growth and strategic investments, questions persist among some Western defense experts regarding the transparency and efficiency of China’s spending. Concerns are often raised that China may under-report actual figures or classify certain military-related expenditures under other budgets. Furthermore, even with substantial funding, challenges remain in areas such as command structure reform, ensuring personnel quality, and achieving seamless integration across military branches, suggesting that raw spending figures do not tell the entire story of combat readiness and effectiveness.
Military equipment: Republic of China Armed Forces
Name: Republic of China Armed Forces,中華民國國軍
Caption: Seal of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China
Founded: National Revolutionary Army
CurrentForm: [object Object]
Branches: marines
Headquarters: Ministry of National Defense (Republic of China)#Headquarters,Zhongshan District, Taipei,Taipei
Website: https://www.mnd.gov.tw/|Chinese,https://www.mnd.gov.tw/English/default.aspx|English
CommanderInChief: Flagicon image,President of the Republic of China,Lai Ching-te
CommanderInChiefTitle: President of the Republic of China
Minister: Flagicon image,Wellington Koo (politician, born 1958)
MinisterTitle: Minister of National Defense (Republic of China)
Commander: Flagicon image,Admiral,Mei Chia-shu
CommanderTitle: Chief of the General Staff (Republic of China)
Age: 18
Conscription: 1 year
Active: 150,000 (2025)
Reserve: 1,657,000 (2025)
Amount: USD
DomesticSuppliers: bulletedlist
ForeignSuppliers: FRA,JPN,NLD,USA
History: bulletedlist
Ranks: Republic of China Armed Forces rank insignia
Title: Republic of China Armed Forces
T: 中華民國國軍
S: 中华民国国军
L: Chinese Republic National Army
W: Chung^1-Hua^2 Min^2-Kuo^2 Kuo^2-Chün^1
Bpmf: ㄓㄨㄥ ㄏㄨㄚˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄐㄩㄣ
P: Zhōnghuá Mínguó Guójūn
Tp: Jhōnghuá Mínguó Guójyūn
Poj: Tiong-hôa Bîn-kok Kok-kun
H: Chûng-fà Mìn-koet Koet-kiûn
Mi: IPAc-cmn
Altname: Shorter name: National Army
T2: 國軍
S2: 国军
W2: Kuo^2-Chün^1
Tp2: Guójyūnear
P2: Guójūn
Bpmf2: ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄐㄩㄣ
Poj2: Kok-kun
H2: Koet-kiûn
Altname3: National Revolutionary Army
T3: 國民革命軍
S3: 国民革命军
W3: Kuo^2-Min^2 Kê^2-Ming^4 Chün^1
Tp3: Guómín Gémìng Jyūn
P3: Guómín Gémìng Jūn
Bpmf3: ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄍㄜˊ ㄇㄧㄥˋ ㄐㄩㄣ
Poj3: Kok-bîn Kek-bēng Kun
Categories: 1924 establishments in China, All articles with dead external links, All articles with unsourced statements, Articles containing Chinese-language text, Articles containing traditional Chinese-language text
Summary: The Republic of China Armed Forces (Chinese: 中華民國國軍) are the national military forces of the Republic of China (ROC), which is now based primarily in the Taiwan Area but formerly governed Mainland China prior to 1949. The armed forces comprise the Army, Navy (including the Marine Corps), Air Force, and Military Police Force. The military operates under the civilian control of the Ministry of National Defense, a cabinet-level body overseen by the Legislative Yuan.
Formerly known as the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), it was renamed the Republic of China Armed Forces in 1947 due to the implementation of the newly promulgated Constitution of the Republic of China. It was also historically referred to as the Chinese National Armed Forces (CNAF) prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland and the gradual loss of international recognition in the 1970s by the United Nations and many countries, including the ROC’s close ally, the United States.
Until the late 1970s, the primary mission of the ROC Armed Forces was to prepare for a counteroffensive aimed at retaking mainland China from the Communists, as exemplified by efforts such as Project National Glory. Following strategic shifts and Taiwan’s evolving political landscape, the military’s focus turned towards the defence of Taiwan itself against potential invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which continues to be perceived as the principal threat.
The ROC Armed Forces today maintain an approximate active strength of 150,000 personnel, with the capability to mobilise up to 1.67 million reservists in times of national emergency or full-scale war. A significant pool of former conscripts is available, as all able-bodied male citizens of the ROC are required to undertake at least one year of compulsory military service upon reaching the age of 18.
Get more information about: Republic of China Armed Forces
3. **Reshaping the Ground Force: The PLA Army’s Evolution** While China has increasingly prioritized naval, air, and strategic capabilities, the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAA) remains the largest branch of the PLA, fielding an estimated 975,000 active-duty troops. Historically perceived as a bulky force relying on large formations and Soviet-era doctrine, the PLAA is now undergoing a significant transformation as part of broader PLA modernization efforts, aiming for a more mobile, better-equipped, and technologically advanced army.
Beijing is systematically reducing overall troop numbers in favor of a leaner, more agile force capable of rapid deployment and precision operations. A substantial portion of China’s defense resources is being channeled into upgrading equipment, reorganizing units, and enhancing sophisticated command-and-control systems. This strategic shift is designed to enable the ground forces to operate effectively in modern, tech-driven warfare scenarios, moving away from massed infantry towards integrated, high-tech formations.
Artillery, a critical component of ground power, has seen significant modernization and expansion. China has deployed long-range rocket systems, notably the PHL-16 multiple launch rocket system. Some analysts suggest the PHL-16 rivals the U.S. HIMARS in terms of both range and firepower, offering the PLA a substantial advantage in area-denial or border-conflict scenarios, particularly along sensitive fronts like the Himalayas or the Taiwan Strait, where precision and long-range engagement are crucial.
In terms of armored warfare, the PLAA is transitioning from older Type 59 and Type 96 models to more advanced main battle tanks such as the Type 99 and the lighter, more mobile Type 15. The Type 99 is engineered for open terrain engagements, while the Type 15 is specifically designed for mountainous and high-altitude regions—areas relevant to China’s ongoing border disputes. While these newer tanks represent a significant technological improvement, their real-world battlefield performance compared to Western counterparts like the U.S. M1 Abrams or Germany’s Leopard 2 remains to be fully assessed.
Another critical area of quiet but significant improvement is logistics. The historical challenge of moving and supplying troops swiftly over vast distances is being addressed through recent reforms emphasizing joint logistics hubs, digitalized supply chains, and an enhanced transport fleet. These fundamental, though less headline-grabbing, advancements are crucial for any modern military aiming to sustain effective operations in a high-intensity conflict, ensuring that the PLAA can project and maintain its presence across diverse and challenging terrains.
Military equipment: Battle of Guningtou
Conflict: Battle of Guningtou,Battle of Kinmen,Battle of Kuningtou
Partof: Cross-Strait conflict
Caption: Today’s Kinmen County, ROC (Taiwan) (red) off the coast of Mainland China (light grey), relative to the rest of Taiwan (dark gray, in inset). Greater Kinmen (Quemoy) is the largest red highlighted island.
Date: Mon Oct 25 2027 00:00:00 GMT-0700 (Pacific Daylight Time)
Place: Kinmen,Fujian Province, Republic of China,Republic of China
Result: Republic of China
Combatant1: flagicon,Republic of China
Combatant2: flagicon,China
Commander1: flagicon,Tang Enbo,flagicon,Hiroshi Nemoto
Commander2: flagicon,Chen Yi (marshal),flagicon,Ye Fei
Strength1: Republic of China Army
Strength2: People’s Liberation Army Ground Force
Casualties1: 1,267 killed,1,982 wounded
Casualties2: 3,873 killed,5,175 captured
Campaignbox: Campaignbox Chinese Civil War
Categories: 1949 in China, All articles needing additional references, All articles with unsourced statements, Articles containing Chinese-language text, Articles containing traditional Chinese-language text
Summary: The Battle of Guningtou (古寧頭之役), also known as the Battle of Kuningtou or the Battle of Kinmen (Chinese: 金門戰役), was fought in October 1949 on the island of Kinmen (Quemoy), located in the Taiwan Strait, during the final stages of the Chinese Civil War.
The battle resulted in a decisive victory for the Republic of China (ROC) forces and marked a significant turning point in the civil war. The defeat of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces not only preserved Kinmen under ROC control but also effectively halted CCP plans for an immediate invasion of Taiwan. The victory ensured the survival of the Republic of China government on Taiwan and reshaped the strategic landscape of the Taiwan Strait.
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4. **From Coastal Defense to Blue-Water Ambition: The PLA Navy’s Rise** Over the past decade, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has undergone a remarkable metamorphosis, evolving from a predominantly coastal defense force into what many now cautiously describe as a near-peer blue-water navy. By most counts, China operates the world’s largest navy in terms of total vessels, with estimates placing its fleet at over 370 warships, including more than 60 submarines. This raw numerical strength, while not the sole measure of naval power, undeniably signals clear strategic intent and an unprecedented pace of expansion.
A key symbol of China’s surging naval power is its growing fleet of aircraft carriers. The Liaoning, a refitted Soviet-era vessel, served as China’s initial foray into carrier operations, primarily as a training platform. Its successor, the Shandong, launched in 2019, marked China’s first domestically built carrier and represented a significant step forward in capability. However, the true leap in China’s carrier ambitions is embodied by the Fujian, launched in 2022 and still undergoing sea trials as of 2025. This advanced carrier features an electromagnetic catapult system, akin to those on the latest U.S. Navy carriers, which, if fully operational, could dramatically enhance aircraft launch rates and enable a broader range of airborne missions.
Despite these impressive developments, the PLAN is still in the process of gaining extensive experience in joint maritime-air operations, intricate carrier battle group coordination, and complex long-range deployments. These are areas where established navies, such as the U.S. Navy, possess decades of accumulated practice and expertise. Consequently, some analysts suggest that China’s carriers, while formidable symbols of national power, may still be more indicative of strategic ambition than decisive operational capability, at least in the immediate future.
Beyond carrier development, China’s expanding naval presence in the South China Sea and the broader Indo-Pacific underscores its immediate power projection capabilities. Through a concerted strategy of island-building, consistent patrols, and regular maritime drills, China has solidified its influence over contested waters. The PLAN has also extended its operational reach into the Indian Ocean, increased port calls in African and Middle Eastern nations, and established its first overseas military facility in Djibouti, collectively signaling a deliberate and sustained outward movement of its naval power.
Ultimately, while China’s naval modernization is undeniably impressive and its global ambitions increasingly explicit, the extent to which the PLAN can translate its growing numbers into sustained maritime dominance remains a subject of ongoing debate. It is clearly a force in rapid transition, yet whether it possesses the global reach, combat experience, and integrated sophistication required for high-intensity, blue-water warfare on par with top-tier navies is still to be definitively proven. The U.S. Navy, for instance, still maintains a significant lead in global reach, combat experience, and the sophistication of its carrier air wings.
Military equipment: Blue-water navy
Categories: All Wikipedia articles in need of updating, Articles with short description, CS1 interwiki-linked names, Military doctrines, Military geography
Summary: A blue-water navy is a maritime force capable of operating globally, essentially across the deep waters of open oceans. While definitions of what actually constitutes such a force vary, there is a requirement for the ability to exercise sea control at long range.
The term “blue-water navy” is a maritime geographical term in contrast with “brown-water navy” (littoral waters and near to shore) and “green-water navy” (near to shore and open oceans).
The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency of the United States has defined the blue-water navy as “a maritime force capable of sustained operation across the deep waters of open oceans. A blue-water navy allows a country to project power far from the home country and usually includes one or more aircraft carriers. Smaller blue-water navies are able to dispatch fewer vessels abroad for shorter periods of time.”
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5. **Ascending the Skies: China’s Fifth-Generation Airpower** Central to an evaluation of China’s military strength in 2025 is the rapid advancement of its airpower, particularly the development of fifth-generation fighter aircraft by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). These advanced platforms represent a clear intent by Beijing to challenge the technological dominance of leading military powers in aerial warfare. The J-20 “Mighty Dragon,” already in active service with the PLAAF, is the most prominent example, frequently drawing comparisons to the U.S. F-22 Raptor.
While the J-20’s precise performance metrics in terms of stealth, sensor integration, and maneuverability relative to its Western counterparts remain a subject of ongoing debate among defense experts, there is a general consensus on its significant evolution. Reports suggest that the J-20’s capabilities have markedly improved, particularly with the integration of newer, domestically produced engines. This enhancement has facilitated its deployment in greater numbers across China’s eastern and southern theater commands, indicating its readiness for operational roles in key strategic regions.
Another stealth platform, the J-31, is reportedly under development and rumored to be aimed at carrier operations. Should it become operational and integrated into China’s naval aviation, it would significantly bolster the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) air capabilities from its growing carrier fleet. However, concrete details regarding its operational readiness, projected capabilities, and timeline for deployment remain largely unconfirmed, highlighting the inherent opaqueness of China’s military development programs.
The aggressive pursuit of these advanced fighter aircraft underscores China’s ambition to achieve air superiority and project power effectively. The J-20, as a stealth platform, is designed to penetrate sophisticated air defenses and engage targets with high precision, representing a qualitative leap for the PLAAF. Its increasing deployment signifies a maturing capability that complicates strategic planning for regional adversaries and the United States.
In essence, China’s investments in fifth-generation airpower are a critical component of its broader military modernization. These aircraft are intended to enhance its ability to conduct both offensive and defensive air operations across various domains. While challenges in full-scale integration and testing under real-world combat conditions persist, the emergence and continuous refinement of platforms like the J-20 are undeniable indicators of a PLAAF that is rapidly closing the technological gap with leading global air forces.
Military equipment: Gloster Meteor
Name: Meteor
AircraftType: Fighter aircraft
NationalOrigin: United Kingdom
Manufacturer: Gloster Aircraft Company
FirstFlight: 5 March 1943
Introduction: 27 July 1944
Retired: 1980s (RAF target tugs)
Status: testbed aircraft
PrimaryUser: Royal Air Force
MoreUsers: Royal Australian Air Force,Belgian Air Force,Argentine Air Force
Produced: 1943–1955
NumberBuilt: 3,947
Categories: 1940s British fighter aircraft, Aircraft first flown in 1943, Aircraft with retractable tricycle landing gear, All articles containing potentially dated statements, All articles with unsourced statements
Summary: The Gloster Meteor was the first British jet fighter and the Allies’ only jet aircraft to engage in combat operations during the Second World War. The Meteor’s development was heavily reliant on its ground-breaking turbojet engines, pioneered by Frank Whittle and his company, Power Jets Ltd. Development of the aircraft began in 1940, although work on the engines had been under way since 1936.
The Meteor first flew in 1943 and commenced operations on 27 July 1944 with No. 616 Squadron RAF. The Meteor was not a sophisticated aircraft in its aerodynamics, but proved to be a successful combat fighter. Gloster’s 1946 civil Meteor F.4 demonstrator G-AIDC was the first civilian-registered jet aircraft in the world. Several major variants of the Meteor incorporated technological advances during the 1940s and 1950s. Thousands of Meteors were built to fly with the RAF and other air forces and remained in use for several decades.
Slower and less heavily armed than its German counterpart, the jet-powered Messerschmitt Me 262, the Meteor saw limited action in the Second World War. Meteors of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) fought in the Korean War. Several other operators such as Argentina, Egypt and Israel flew Meteors in later regional conflicts. Specialised variants of the Meteor were developed for use in photographic aerial reconnaissance and as night fighters.
The Meteor was also used in research and development and to break several aviation records. On 20 September 1945, a heavily modified Meteor I, powered by two Rolls-Royce RB.50 Trent turbine engines driving propellers, became the first turboprop aircraft to fly. On 7 November 1945, a Meteor F.3 set the first official airspeed record by a jet aircraft at 606 miles per hour (975 km/h). In 1946, a Meteor F.4 reached a record speed of 616 miles per hour (991 km/h). Meteors also broke records in flight time endurance and rate of climb.
On 10 February 1954, a specially adapted Meteor F.8, the “Meteor Prone Pilot”, which placed the pilot into a prone position to counteract inertial forces, took its first flight.
In the 1950s, the Meteor became increasingly obsolete as more nations developed jet fighters, many of which used a swept wing instead of the Meteor’s conventional straight wing. The RAF service replaced its Meteors with newer types such as the Hawker Hunter and Gloster Javelin.
As of 2023, two Meteors, G-JSMA and G-JWMA, remained in active service with the Martin-Baker company as ejection seat testbeds. One further aircraft in the USA remained airworthy, as did another in Australia.
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6. **The Rise of the Machines: China’s Extensive Drone Capabilities** Complementing its advanced manned aircraft, China has aggressively expanded its development and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones. This strategic focus positions drones as a critical component of China’s future warfare doctrine, offering significant advantages in surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike missions. Systems like the Wing Loong and CH-series drones are not only widely exported globally but are also reportedly being integrated into Chinese military operations, particularly in contested areas.
These domestically produced drones are designed to provide China with a significant edge in asymmetric operations, offering persistent surveillance and precision strike capabilities over vast areas. In regions such as the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, where monitoring and rapid response are crucial, the extensive use of UAVs could offer Beijing tactical and strategic advantages. Their ability to operate in high-risk environments without endangering human pilots makes them invaluable assets for intelligence gathering and target engagement.
Beyond traditional drone applications, China is also exploring and integrating more advanced concepts. The unveiling of self-splitting swarming drones in March, for example, represents a significant leap in autonomous systems. Such swarms, capable of independent decision-making and coordinated action, could overwhelm enemy defenses and conduct complex, multi-domain combat scenarios. This highlights China’s commitment to “intelligentized” warfare, which prioritizes advanced technologies and AI-driven analysis.
However, the seamless integration of these diverse drone platforms into complex, multi-domain combat scenarios, especially at the scale seen in Western forces, remains an area of ongoing development for the PLAAF. While China demonstrates a clear technological lead in drone production and innovation, the operational doctrines and command-and-control systems required for their full effectiveness in a modern, high-intensity conflict are still evolving.
The proliferation of China’s drone technology, both domestically and through exports, underscores a broader strategic shift towards leveraging unmanned systems for a range of military applications. This extensive investment in UAVs, from reconnaissance to advanced swarming capabilities, signals China’s intent to dominate this crucial domain of modern warfare, providing flexible and potent tools for projecting power and gathering intelligence across its spheres of interest.
Military equipment: Science and technology in China
Categories: All Wikipedia articles written in American English, All articles lacking reliable references, All articles with minor POV problems, All articles with specifically marked weasel-worded phrases, All articles with unsourced statements
Summary: Science and technology in the People’s Republic of China have developed rapidly since the 1980s to the 2020s, with major scientific and technological progress over the last four decades. From the 1980s to the 1990s, the government of the People’s Republic of China successively launched the 863 Program and the “Strategy to Revitalize the Country Through Science and Education”, which greatly promoted the development of China’s science and technological institutions. Governmental focus on prioritizing the advancement of science and technology in China is evident in its allocation of funds, investment in research, reform measures, and enhanced societal recognition of these fields. These actions undertaken by the Chinese government are seen as crucial foundations for bolstering the nation’s socioeconomic competitiveness and development, projecting its geopolitical influence, and elevating its national prestige and international reputation.
As per the Global Innovation Index in 2022, China was considered one of the most competitive in the world, ranking eleventh in the world, third in the Asia & Oceania region, and second for countries with a population of over 100 million. In 2024, China is still ranked 11th.
Get more information about: Science and technology in China
7. **Strategic Reach: The PLAAF’s Long-Range Bomber Fleet** When evaluating the long-range power projection capabilities of China’s military in 2025, the evolution of the PLA Air Force’s (PLAAF) strategic bomber fleet stands out as a critical component. This fleet is essential for extending China’s operational reach beyond its immediate periphery and for contributing to its nascent nuclear triad. The H-6K, a heavily upgraded variant of a Cold War-era design, currently forms the backbone of this capability.
The H-6K has undergone significant modernization, featuring extended range and enhanced precision-strike capabilities. It is reportedly capable of carrying long-range cruise missiles, significantly increasing its ability to engage targets at considerable distances. This bomber has been observed conducting patrols around Taiwan and in the Western Pacific, demonstrating China’s growing capacity to project airpower and assert its presence in strategically vital regions, challenging existing security dynamics.
More intriguing, and indicative of China’s future ambitions, is the reported development of the H-20, a next-generation stealth bomber. Although still unconfirmed and shrouded in secrecy, the H-20 is anticipated to represent a major leap in China’s strategic air power. If it enters service within this decade, as some analysts project, it could significantly enhance China’s ability to conduct long-range strike missions with reduced detectability.
The H-20, if its capabilities match the speculation, would fundamentally alter the strategic calculus in the Indo-Pacific. A true long-range stealth bomber would provide Beijing with a robust and credible air leg for its nuclear triad, complementing its land-based missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This would significantly complicate planning for the U.S. and its allies, as it would introduce a new dimension of threat projection from the PLAAF.
Ultimately, China’s investments in its strategic bomber fleet, from the modernized H-6K to the prospective H-20, speak to an ambitious and rapidly evolving strategy aimed at developing a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower projection. These platforms are crucial for China’s broader goal of operating militarily beyond the First Island Chain and securing its perceived global security interests, reinforcing its image as a global power with increasing reach and influence.
Military equipment: People’s Liberation Army Air Force
UnitName: People’s Liberation Army Air Force
Caption: Emblem of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force
StartDate: start date and age
Country: PRC
Allegiance: CCP flag
Type: Air force
Role: Aerial warfare,Airborne forces,Air defense
Size: 403000 active personnel
CommandStructure: armed forces
Garrison: Beijing
GarrisonLabel: Headquarters
Motto: lang,Serve the People
Colours: color box
ColoursLabel: Colors
March: March of the Chinese Air Force
Anniversaries: 11 November annually
Battles: blist
Commander1: Jiang (rank),Chang Dingqiu
Commander1Label: Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force
Commander2: Jiang (rank),Guo Puxiao
Commander2Label: Political Commissar
Commander3: Jiang (rank),Wang Gang (general)
Commander3Label: Chief of Staff
IdentificationSymbol: File:Roundel of China.svg,File:Roundel of China – Low Visibility – Type 2.svg
IdentificationSymbolLabel: Military aircraft insignia
IdentificationSymbol2: File:Air Force Flag of the People’s Republic of China.svg
IdentificationSymbol2Label: Flag
IdentificationSymbol3: File:People’s Liberation Army Air Force sleeve badge.svg
IdentificationSymbol3Label: Sleeve badge
AircraftBomber: Xian JH-7,Xian H-6
AircraftElectronic: Tu-154,Shaanxi Y-8,Shaanxi Y-9,J-16D
AircraftFighter: Shenyang J-8,Chengdu J-10,Shenyang J-11,Shenyang J-16,Chengdu J-20,Shenyang J-35,Su-27,Su-30MKK,Su-35S
AircraftHelicopter: Harbin Z-8,Harbin Z-9
AircraftHelicopterAttack: Harbin Z-19,CAIC Z-10
AircraftHelicopterUtility: Harbin Z-20
AircraftInterceptor: Shenyang J-8
AircraftTrainer: Hongdu L-15,Hongdu JL-8,JL-9
AircraftTransport: Xian Y-20,Shaanxi Y-9,Shaanxi Y-8,Xian Y-7,Il-76
AircraftTanker: Xian H-6,Il-78
Module: infobox Chinese
S: 中国人民解放军空军
T: 中國人民解放軍空軍
P: Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn Kōngjūn
L: China People Liberation Army Air Army
Order: st
Child: yes
Categories: 1949 establishments in China, All Wikipedia articles needing context, All Wikipedia articles written in American English, All articles with unsourced statements, All pages needing cleanup
Summary: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force, also referred to as the Chinese Air Force (中国空军) or the People’s Air Force (人民空军), is the primary aerial warfare service of the People’s Liberation Army. The PLAAF controls most of the PLA’s air assets, including tactical aircraft, large airlifters, and strategic bombers. It includes ground-based air defense assets, including national early-warning radars, and controls the Airborne Corps.
The PLAAF traces its origins to the establishment of a small aviation unit by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1924, during the early years of the Republic of China. This initial group comprised nine cadets who trained under the Guangzhou Revolutionary Government Aviation Bureau, with further advanced training in the Soviet Union. Despite initial resource constraints, including a lack of aircraft and airfields, the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC) established foundational aviation schools and, by the end of World War II, had begun significant organizational developments.
The formal establishment of the PLAAF occurred on November 11, 1949, following the CCP’s victory in the Chinese Civil War. Early on, the PLAAF operated a mix of captured Kuomintang (KMT) and Soviet aircraft and began organizing its structure around several aviation divisions. The PLAAF first faced combat in the Korean War against the United States using primarily the Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighter aircraft provided by the Soviet Union, which also assisted with the expansion of the Chinese aerospace industry. Post-Korean War, the PLAAF focused on enhancing air defense capabilities, a strategy influenced by political decisions to limit offensive operations. The 1960s brought considerable challenges due to the Sino-Soviet split, which strained resources and technical support. This period also saw the detrimental impacts of the Cultural Revolution on the PLAAF’s development and readiness. In the following decades, especially the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant reforms which included force reduction and reorganization aimed at modernizing its capabilities in line with advancing air power technology. These efforts were somewhat hampered by the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre, which resulted in Western sanctions but eventually led to increased military collaboration with Russia in the 1990s.
Entering the 21st century, the PLAAF made substantial progress in transitioning to more modern airpower with the acquisition and development of advanced aircraft like the Sukhoi Su-27 and domestic models such as the J-10 and J-20. The strategic orientation of the PLAAF continued to evolve with a focus on expanding its operational capabilities, including the development of long-range bombers and enhancing joint operational capacity with other branches of the Chinese military.
Get more information about: People’s Liberation Army Air Force
8. **The PLARF’s Formidable Missile Arsenal: A Strategic Threat**The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) commands an arsenal that many analysts now consider among the most formidable globally, representing a core pillar of China’s strategic deterrent. This dedicated branch oversees a wide array of ballistic missiles, ranging from tactical short-range systems like the DF-11 and DF-15, crucial for regional contingencies, to intercontinental-range platforms such as the DF-41, which is believed to be capable of delivering multiple nuclear warheads across vast distances.
Perhaps the most notable advancement within the PLARF’s inventory is the DF-17, a system featuring a hypersonic glide vehicle. This advanced missile reportedly travels at speeds exceeding Mach 5 while executing evasive maneuvers mid-flight, a capability that significantly complicates its interception by existing missile defense systems. The development and deployment of such technologies underscore China’s concerted effort to achieve decisive advantages in areas that challenge conventional military responses.
China’s missile forces, bolstered by parallel advancements in targeting and reconnaissance systems, are increasingly capable of posing serious challenges to potential adversaries. Their precision and range could threaten crucial U.S. bases and aircraft carrier strike groups deployed in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby altering the strategic calculus for any future conflict. This capability is not merely theoretical; it influences operational planning and deterrence strategies for major powers.
However, the ultimate real-world effectiveness of these systems in a prolonged, high-intensity conflict remains subject to ongoing debate among defense analysts. Questions persist regarding their accuracy under combat conditions, their survivability against sophisticated counter-measures, and their scalability for sustained operations. While China’s missile capabilities are undeniably growing in sophistication and numbers, their full operational potential and strategic impact are still being assessed.
Military equipment: SSBN – Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
Manufacturer: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division
Service: USN
Armament: 24 tubes for Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles, MK48 torpedoes, four torpedo tubes
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft.
Speed: 20+ knots
Crew: 15 Officers, 140 Enlisted
Categories: Ballistic Missile Submarines, Navy Equipment, Navy Ships and Submarines, Ships and Submarines, Submarines
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9. **China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrence: Expanding Arsenal and Triad**China’s nuclear arsenal, once characterized by a policy of “minimum deterrence,” is undergoing a rapid and significant expansion, increasingly drawing global attention. As of 2025, Western estimates, including those from the U.S. Department of Defense and SIPRI, indicate China possesses over 500 operational nuclear warheads. This figure has more than doubled in just a few years, with projections suggesting Beijing could exceed 1,000 warheads by the early 2030s, reshaping the long-standing nuclear balance.
A primary driver of this buildup is China’s concerted push to establish a credible second-strike capability – the assurance that it can respond with nuclear force even after absorbing a devastating first strike. Historically, China’s retaliatory options were perceived as somewhat limited. However, the recent construction of new missile silo fields in western China, coupled with the deployment of highly survivable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like the DF-41, which can carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), demonstrates a clear effort to enhance survivability and response flexibility.
Furthermore, China is making steady progress toward developing a comprehensive nuclear triad, mirroring the strategic architecture maintained by leading nuclear powers. The land-based leg of this triad comprises a diverse mix of older and newer ICBMs, including solid-fueled and road-mobile variants that are inherently harder to detect and preempt. These systems provide a robust and versatile ground-based deterrent, capable of operating from dispersed locations.
At sea, China’s Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) currently serve as its underwater deterrent, equipped with JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). A next-generation JL-3 SLBM is reportedly under development, promising extended range that would enable strikes on the continental United States from waters closer to China. While challenges in submarine quieting and command-and-control integration persist, the maturation of its sea-based deterrent is undeniable.
The air leg of the triad, while the least developed, is also receiving attention. The modernized H-6K bomber is believed to be nuclear-capable, and the prospective H-20 stealth bomber, once operational, could provide Beijing with a true long-range strategic air delivery option. Despite China’s public adherence to a “no first use” policy, the rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear capabilities are fundamentally reshaping the strategic landscape, prompting international scrutiny regarding its long-term nuclear doctrine.
Military equipment: List of states with nuclear weapons
Categories: All articles containing potentially dated statements, All articles with unsourced statements, Articles containing potentially dated statements from 2024, Articles containing potentially dated statements from April 2019, Articles containing potentially dated statements from June 2023
Summary: Nine sovereign states are generally understood to possess nuclear weapons, though only eight formally acknowledge possessing them. In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons, these are the United States, Russia (as successor to the former Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel (not formally acknowledged), India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
The first five of these are the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They are also the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the only nations confirmed to possess thermonuclear weapons. Israel, India, and Pakistan never joined the NPT, while North Korea acceded in 1983 but announced its withdrawal in 2003.
Israel is widely understood to have nuclear weapons, with a medium-sized arsenal, but does not officially acknowledge it, maintaining a policy of deliberate ambiguity. One possible motivation for nuclear ambiguity is deterrence with minimum political friction.
States that formerly possessed nuclear weapons are South Africa, which developed nuclear weapons but then disassembled its arsenal before joining the NPT in 1991, and the former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, whose weapons were transferred to Russia by 1996.
In addition, six non-nuclear-armed states currently have foreign nuclear weapons based on their territory. United States weapons are deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, while Russian weapons are deployed in Belarus. During the Cold War, NATO and Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed in at least 23 countries.
According to the Federation of American Scientists there are approximately 3,904 active nuclear warheads and 12,331 total nuclear warheads in the world as of 2025. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated in 2024 that the total number of nuclear warheads acquired by nuclear states reached 12,121. Approximately 9,585 are kept with military stockpiles. About 3,904 warheads are deployed with operational forces. 2,100 warheads, which are primarily from Russia and the United States, are maintained for high operational alerts.
Get more information about: List of states with nuclear weapons
10. **Intelligentized Warfare: The Cognitive Domain as the New Battlefield**One of the most profound shifts in China’s military doctrine is its embrace of “intelligentized warfare,” a concept first introduced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2019. This strategic approach elevates advanced technologies, particularly autonomous systems and Artificial Intelligence (AI), to a central role in modern conflict. The overarching goal is to significantly improve battlefield efficiency, optimize decision-making processes, and crucially, influence the cognitive domain of adversaries.
Chinese military strategists view intelligentized warfare as hinging on superior information-processing capabilities and sophisticated AI-driven analysis. This means leveraging vast amounts of data to gain an information advantage, enabling faster and more accurate assessments of complex situations. Such a framework aims to provide decision-makers with superior insights, allowing for quicker and more effective responses in dynamic combat scenarios.
A key manifestation of this strategy involves the deployment of drone swarms, which are envisioned as tools capable of overwhelming enemy defenses and executing complex, multi-domain combat scenarios. These autonomous systems, equipped with AI, can make independent decisions and coordinate actions, pushing the boundaries of traditional warfare tactics. The self-splitting swarming drones unveiled in March exemplify this ambition, showcasing a significant leap in autonomous systems.
Critically, intelligentized warfare extends beyond the physical destruction of targets or the disruption of information networks; it marks a strategic shift toward the cognitive domain as a critical battlefield. This involves efforts to sway the perceptions, morale, and decision-making of opposing forces through information manipulation and psychological operations. The recent establishment of the Information Support Force underscores this view, highlighting Beijing’s intent to dominate this multifaceted aspect of conflict.
Military equipment: Internet of Military Things
Categories: 21st-century inventions, Ambient intelligence, Articles with short description, Computing and society, Digital technology
Summary: The Internet of Military Things (IoMT) is a class of Internet of things for combat operations and warfare. It is a complex network of interconnected entities, or “things”, in the military domain that continually communicate with each other to coordinate, learn, and interact with the physical environment to accomplish a broad range of activities in a more efficient and informed manner. The concept of IoMT is largely driven by the idea that future military battles will be dominated by machine intelligence and cyber warfare and will likely take place in urban environments. By creating a miniature ecosystem of smart technology capable of distilling sensory information and autonomously governing multiple tasks at once, the IoMT is conceptually designed to offload much of the physical and mental burden that warfighters encounter in a combat setting.
Over time, several different terms have been introduced to describe the use of IoT technology for reconnaissance, environment surveillance, unmanned warfare and other combat purposes. These terms include the Military Internet of Things (MIoT), the Internet of Battle Things, and the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT).
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11. **The Strategic Support Force and Cyber-Electronic Warfare: The Digital Frontier**China’s commitment to modern warfare extends deeply into the digital and electronic domains, primarily through specialized PLA cyber units, which until April of this year were largely under the Strategic Support Force (SSF). Though the SSF was recently disbanded and reemerged as the Information Support Force, this reorganization signals a deliberate and continued emphasis on enhancing capabilities in information warfare and cyber operations, regarded by the CCP as the “largest variable[s]” in contemporary conflict.
These specialized units are widely believed to possess substantial capabilities for both offensive and defensive cyber operations. Past incidents have suggested a demonstrated capacity for espionage, intellectual property theft, and network disruption against various targets globally. However, the full extent of their resilience and effectiveness in a prolonged, high-intensity cyber conflict against a peer adversary remains uncertain, particularly regarding their ability to withstand sophisticated countermeasures.
Electronic warfare (EW) has concurrently become a major focus for the PLA. Significant resources are being directed towards developing advanced jamming systems, designed to interfere with enemy communications, radar, and navigation. This also includes the development of anti-satellite weapons and various tools aimed at achieving spectrum dominance, which is critical for controlling the electromagnetic environment on the modern battlefield and denying adversaries the use of their own electronic systems.
The Strategic Support Force, and now the Information Support Force, integrates these cyber, electronic, and space warfare capabilities across the “four services”—the army, navy, air force, and rocket force. This integration underscores China’s holistic approach to information-centric warfare, where digital, orbital, and data-driven battlefields are seen as equally, if not more, decisive than traditional physical domains. The opaque nature of these capabilities, however, continues to be a point of international concern.
Military equipment: Computer security
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Summary: Computer security (also cybersecurity, digital security, or information technology (IT) security) is a subdiscipline within the field of information security. It focuses on protecting computer software, systems and networks from threats that can lead to unauthorized information disclosure, theft or damage to hardware, software, or data, as well as from the disruption or misdirection of the services they provide.
The growing significance of computer insecurity reflects the increasing dependence on computer systems, the Internet, and evolving wireless network standards. This reliance has expanded with the proliferation of smart devices, including smartphones, televisions, and other components of the Internet of things (IoT).
As digital infrastructure becomes more embedded in everyday life, cybersecurity has emerged as a critical concern. The complexity of modern information systems—and the societal functions they underpin—has introduced new vulnerabilities. Systems that manage essential services, such as power grids, electoral processes, and finance, are particularly sensitive to security breaches.
Although many aspects of computer security involve digital security, such as electronic passwords and encryption, physical security measures such as metal locks are still used to prevent unauthorized tampering. IT security is not a perfect subset of information security, therefore does not completely align into the security convergence schema.
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12. **China’s Assertive Space Warfare Capabilities: Contesting Orbital Dominance**China’s military modernization extends significantly into the space domain, where Beijing is actively seeking to nullify what it perceives as the U.S. advantage in on-orbit assets. This ambition is reflected in its rapid development of a comprehensive range of space weapons, collectively known as counterspace capabilities in U.S. parlance. These capabilities are designed to contest or deny other nations access to, and operations within, the critical space domain.
Among these counterspace capabilities are direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, which are designed to physically destroy enemy satellites in orbit. Additionally, China is developing co-orbital satellites that can maneuver near adversary spacecraft, potentially for inspection, jamming, or kinetic attack. Electronic warfare systems tailored for space, and directed energy weapons capable of disrupting or damaging satellites, further underscore Beijing’s multi-pronged approach to achieving space dominance.
Concerns about China’s assertiveness in space are mounting, with the head of the U.S. Space Force warning in November about the “mind-boggling” rate at which China is deploying military capabilities into orbit. This rapid pace significantly increases the risk of warfare in space, with potentially catastrophic consequences for global communication and surveillance infrastructure. China’s leadership in defense-related satellite launches in both 2022 and 2023 highlights this aggressive expansion.
A tangible example of this advanced capability is the Yaogan-41 remote-sensing satellite, launched in December. This satellite is reportedly capable of identifying and tracking objects as small as a car in the Indo-Pacific region, posing a direct threat to U.S. and allied assets. Such sophisticated surveillance capabilities, combined with offensive counterspace weapons, enable China to enhance its targeting precision and deny adversaries the critical intelligence derived from space-based platforms.
Military equipment: China–United States relations
Envoytitle1: List of ambassadors of China to the United States
Envoy1: Xie Feng (diplomat)
Envoytitle2: List of ambassadors of the United States to China
Envoy2: David Perdue
Mission1: Embassy of China, Washington, D.C.
Mission2: Embassy of the United States, Beijing
Map: China USA Locator.svg
Categories: All Wikipedia articles in need of updating, All Wikipedia articles written in American English, All articles lacking reliable references, All articles that may be too long, All articles with dead external links
Summary: The relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. It has been complex and at times tense since the establishment of the PRC and the retreat of the government of the Republic of China to Taiwan in 1949. Since the normalization of relations in the 1970s, the US–China relationship has been marked by persistent disputes including China’s economic policies, the political status of Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Despite these tensions, the two nations have significant economic ties and are deeply interconnected, while also engaging in strategic competition on the global stage. As of 2025, China and the United States are the world’s second-largest and largest economies by nominal GDP, as well as the largest and second-largest economies by GDP (PPP) respectively. Collectively, they account for 44.2% of the global nominal GDP, and 34.7% of global PPP-adjusted GDP.
One of the earliest major interactions between the United States and China was the 1845 Treaty of Wangxia, which laid the foundation for trade between the two countries. While American businesses anticipated a vast market in China, trade grew gradually. In 1900, Washington joined the Empire of Japan and other powers of Europe in sending troops to suppress the anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion, later promoting the Open Door Policy to advocate for equal trade opportunities and discourage territorial divisions in China. Despite hopes that American financial influence would expand, efforts during the Taft presidency to secure US investment in Chinese railways were unsuccessful. President Franklin D. Roosevelt supported China during the Second Sino-Japanese War, aligning with the Republic of China (ROC) government, which had formed a temporary alliance with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to fight the Japanese. Following Japan’s defeat, the Chinese Civil War resumed, and US diplomatic efforts to mediate between the Nationalists and Communists ultimately failed. The Communist forces prevailed, leading to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, while the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan.
Relations between the US and the new Chinese government quickly soured, culminating in direct conflict during the Korean War. The US-led United Nations intervention was met with Chinese military involvement, as Beijing sent millions of Chinese fighters to prevent a US-aligned presence on its border. For decades, the United States did not formally recognize the PRC, instead maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC based in Taiwan, and as such blocked the PRC’s entry into the United Nations. However, shifting geopolitical dynamics, including the Sino-Soviet split, the winding down of the Vietnam War, as well as of the Cultural Revolution, paved the way for US President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, ultimately marking a sea change in US–China relations. On 1 January 1979, the US formally established diplomatic relations with the PRC and recognized it as the sole legitimate government of China, while maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan within the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act, an issue that remains a major point of contention between the two countries to the present day.
Every U.S. president since Nixon has toured China during his term in office, with the exception of Jimmy Carter and Joe Biden. The Obama administration signed a record number of bilateral agreements with China, particularly regarding climate change, though its broader strategy of rebalancing towards Asia created diplomatic friction. The advent of Xi Jinping’s general secretaryship would prefigure a sharp downturn in these relations, which was then further entrenched upon the election of President Donald Trump, who had promised an assertive stance towards China as a part of his campaign, which began to be implemented upon his taking office. Issues included China’s militarization of the South China Sea, alleged manipulation of the Chinese currency, and Chinese espionage in the United States. The Trump administration would label China a “strategic competitor” in 2017. In January 2018, Trump launched a trade war with China, while also restricting American companies from selling equipment to various Chinese companies linked to human rights abuses in Xinjiang, among which included Chinese technology conglomerates Huawei and ZTE. The U.S. revoked preferential treatment towards Hong Kong after the Beijing’s enactment of a broad-reaching national security law in the city, increased visa restrictions on Chinese students and researchers, and strengthened relations with Taiwan. In response, China adopted “wolf warrior diplomacy”, countering U.S. criticisms of human rights abuses. By early 2018, various geopolitical observers had begun to speak of a new Cold War between the two powers. On the last day of the Trump administration in January 2021, the U.S. officially classified the Chinese government’s treatment of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang as a genocide.
Following the election of Joe Biden in the 2020 United States presidential election, tensions between the two countries remained high. Biden identified strategic competition with China as a top priority in his foreign policy. His administration imposed large-scale restrictions on the sale of semiconductor technology to China, boosted regional alliances against China, and expanded support for Taiwan. However, the Biden administration also emphasized that the U.S. sought “competition, not conflict”, with Biden stating in late 2022 that “there needs to not be a new Cold War”. Despite efforts at diplomatic engagement, U.S.-China trade and political relations have reached their lowest point in years, largely due to disagreements over technology and China’s military growth and human rights record. In his second term, President Donald Trump sharply escalated the trade war with China, raising baseline tariffs on Chinese imports to an effective 145%, prior to negotiating with China on 12 May 2025 a reduction in the tariff rate to 30% for 90 days while further negotiations take place.
Get more information about: China–United States relations
13. **The Backbone of Power: China’s Expanding Defense Industrial Base**The sheer scale and accelerating pace of China’s military buildup are fundamentally underpinned by a vast and increasingly sophisticated defense industrial base. This robust infrastructure has enabled China to become the world’s largest shipbuilder, boasting a capacity estimated to be 230 times greater than that of the United States. Such industrial prowess translates directly into rapid fleet expansion, supporting the PLA Navy’s ambitious trajectory toward becoming a formidable blue-water force.
Beijing’s strategy of military-civil fusion further amplifies its industrial capacity, allowing ostensibly civilian assets to be repurposed for military ends. For instance, China’s enormous fishing fleet, comprising an estimated 500,000 vessels, including up to 3,000 in its “distant-water fleet,” can be leveraged for intelligence gathering or to assert maritime presence. Similarly, civilian shipping and even large cruise ships, like the domestically produced Adora Magic City, can be swiftly adapted to mask troop movements, provide logistical support to contested outposts, or potentially deploy thousands of soldiers in a single wave.
The growth of China’s defense industry is also evident in the global standing of its defense companies. A decade ago, no Chinese firms were among the world’s top 12 defense companies; today, five are. These corporations are at the forefront of producing a diverse range of advanced technologies, from diesel engines and electronic systems to advanced submarines and sophisticated unmanned systems, including autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) like the HSU-001 and subsequent larger variants.
This rapid churn of military hardware is facilitated by unparalleled manufacturing capabilities. The Jiangnan shipyard on Changxing Island, for example, is believed to possess a shipbuilding capacity greater than all U.S. shipyards combined. This impressive industrial might allows China to not only rapidly expand its conventional forces but also to develop and integrate cutting-edge technologies, providing a continuous flow of modern weaponry to all branches of the PLA.
Military equipment: State-owned enterprises of China
Categories: All articles containing potentially dated statements, Articles containing potentially dated statements from 2017, Articles containing potentially dated statements from 2019, Articles containing potentially dated statements from 2023, Articles with short description
Summary: A state-owned enterprise of the People’s Republic of China (Chinese: 国有企业) is a legal entity that undertakes commercial activities on behalf of an owner government.
As of 2017, the People’s Republic of China has more SOEs than any other country, and the most SOEs among large national companies. As of the end of 2019, China’s SOEs represented 4.5% of the global economy and the total assets of all China’s SOEs, including those operating in the financial sector, reached US$78.08 trillion.
State-owned enterprises accounted for over 60% of China’s market capitalization in 2019 and estimates suggest that they generated about 23-28% of China’s GDP in 2017 and employ between 5% and 16% of the workforce. Ninety-one (91) of these SOEs belong to the 2020 Fortune Global 500 companies. Almost 867,000 enterprises have a degree of state ownership, according to Franklin Allen of Imperial College London.
The role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in SOEs has varied at different periods but has increased during the general secretaryship of Xi Jinping, with the CCP formally taking a commanding role in all SOEs as of 2020.
Get more information about: State-owned enterprises of China
Read more about: China’s Ascendant Naval Power: Unpacking Beijing’s Maritime Strategy and Its Implications for the South China Sea and Beyond
14. **Global Power Shift in the Making: Deterrence and Responses**China’s accelerating military buildup and strategic technological advancements are undeniably raising urgent concerns for the U.S. and its allies worldwide, suggesting a significant global power shift in the making. The orchestrated show of strength during China’s Joint Sword-2024B military exercises, involving multiple PLA branches in a likely rehearsal for a Taiwan contingency, underscores Beijing’s readiness to confront perceived adversaries and reshape the regional security landscape.
The dilemma facing developed countries, particularly the U.S. and its European allies, is a perceived inability or unwillingness to keep pace with China’s rapid military expansion. The U.S. defense production system, having stalled after the Cold War, is struggling to credibly deter China, let alone sustain a multi-front conflict. This shortfall in munitions and equipment, coupled with a lack of information warfare capabilities to counter Beijing’s cognitive strategies, presents a significant strategic vulnerability.
Europe’s defenses, similarly, have suffered from years of neglect, barely managing to address Russian aggression, much less contribute significantly to a pivot to the Pacific. While the inaugural European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) released in March aims to enhance readiness, its modest funding and bureaucratic layers indicate that a comprehensive, unified European response to China remains elusive. Member states continue to exhibit fragmented approaches to security and China policy.
If the aim is genuine deterrence, Washington and its allies must invest considerable resources and focus into military readiness, going beyond merely keeping pace. A robust military posture is deemed essential to compel Beijing to reconsider any military action. Without such a concerted and urgent effort, the current balance of power risks shifting further in China’s favor, potentially leading to instability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
Military equipment: Mutual assured destruction
Perrow: 2/2/2
TotalWidth: 400
Footer: Nuclear weapons delivery,strategic nuclear weapons
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Summary: Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy which posits that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities would result in the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. It is based on the theory of rational deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents the enemy’s use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which, once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm.
The result may be a nuclear peace, in which the presence of nuclear weapons decreases the risk of crisis escalation, since parties will seek to avoid situations that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. Proponents of nuclear peace theory therefore believe that controlled nuclear proliferation may be beneficial for global stability. Critics argue that nuclear proliferation increases the chance of nuclear war through either deliberate or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, as well as the likelihood of nuclear material falling into the hands of violent non-state actors.
The term “mutual assured destruction”, commonly abbreviated “MAD”, was coined by Donald Brennan, a strategist working in Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute in 1962. Brennan conceived the acronym cynically, spelling out the English word “mad” to argue that holding weapons capable of destroying society was irrational.
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15. **Internal Challenges and Persistent Uncertainties: The Path Ahead**Despite the impressive narrative of China’s military modernization, persistent internal challenges and uncertainties temper the assessment of its true strength in 2025. While President Xi Jinping remains steadfast in his commitment to a “world-class military,” issues such as corruption purges within the military leadership have reportedly disrupted the PLA’s progress toward its stated 2027 modernization goals. More than a dozen high-ranking officers and defense industry executives were removed in the latter half of 2023 due to corruption allegations.
Economic headwinds also pose a potential, though currently mitigated, challenge. Despite a slowing Chinese economy, experts note that the military buildup continues “full steam ahead,” underscoring Beijing’s strategic prioritization. However, the long-term sustainability of this accelerated growth, particularly if economic pressures intensify, remains an open question, potentially impacting the allocation of resources for future military programs.
Furthermore, questions persist among Western defense experts regarding the transparency and efficiency of China’s defense spending. Concerns are frequently raised that actual figures may be under-reported or disguised within other budgets, making a clear assessment of true investment challenging. This opacity adds another layer of uncertainty when evaluating the real capabilities being generated by the substantial financial outlays.
Ultimately, while China’s military has made serious technological leaps and expanded its global presence, the full extent and effectiveness of this burgeoning force are still evolving and complex to answer with absolute certainty. Challenges remain in command structure reform, ensuring personnel quality, and achieving seamless integration across diverse military branches for high-intensity, full-scale combat. The real measure of its power hinges not just on numbers or technology, but on its capacity to operate effectively under real-world conditions, a test it has yet to definitively face.
Military equipment: Tariffs in the second Trump administration
Categories: 2025 in American politics, 2025 in economic history, 2025 in international relations, All Wikipedia articles needing copy edit, All Wikipedia articles written in American English
Summary: During his second presidency, Donald Trump, president of the United States, triggered a global trade war after he enacted a series of steep tariffs affecting nearly all goods imported into the country. From January to April 2025, the average applied US tariff rate rose from 2.5% to an estimated 27%—the highest level in over a century. After changes and negotiations, the rate was estimated at 18.6% as of August 2025. By July 2025, tariffs represented 5% of federal revenue compared to 2% historically.
Under Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, Trump raised steel, aluminum, and copper tariffs to 50% and introduced a 25% tariff on imported cars from most countries. New tariffs on pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and other sectors are under consideration.
Trump also claimed unprecedented tariff authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). On April 2, 2025, he invoked the law to impose “reciprocal tariffs” on imports from all countries not subject to other sanctions. A universal 10% tariff took effect on April 5. Although plans for additional country-specific “reciprocal tariffs” were delayed in the wake of the 2025 stock market crash, they were ultimately implemented on August 7. The de minimis exemption was eliminated effective August 29, 2025 under the IEEPA; previously, packages valued below $800 were exempt from tariffs. Sweeping use of the IEEPA sparked a trade war with Canada and Mexico and escalated the China–United States trade war.
Federal courts have ruled that the tariffs imposed under the IEEPA are illegal; however, they remain in effect while the case is appealed. In V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals allowed the IEEPA tariffs to stand until at least October 14, 2025, to give the government time to seek review by the Supreme Court. The rulings do not affect tariffs imposed under Section 232 or Section 301.
The Trump administration argues that its tariffs will promote domestic manufacturing, protect national security, and substitute for income taxes. The administration views trade deficits as inherently harmful, a stance economists criticized as a flawed understanding of trade. Although Trump has said foreign countries pay his tariffs, US tariffs are fees paid by businesses that import foreign goods, which are then often passed on to US consumers. The tariffs contributed to downgraded GDP growth projections by the Federal Reserve, the OECD, and the World Bank.
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China’s journey to achieve a “world-class military” by 2049 is undeniably ambitious, marked by extraordinary advancements and a relentless strategic drive. Yet, as this in-depth analysis reveals, the path is fraught with complexities, requiring a nuanced understanding of both its undeniable strengths and its evolving challenges. The world watches keenly as the Dragon continues to spread its wings, transforming the global security landscape in profound and often unpredictable ways.
